

















Certain regulations in developing countries have often been cited as impediments to progress.  
This paper considers one facet of these regulations – labor laws – and investigates whether these 
have detrimental effects on firm location and investment decisions.  Conventional wisdom holds 
that pro-worker labor regulations within a state would hinder firm location in that state.  We find 
strong evidence that this is indeed the case, and our results are robust to alternative 
specifications.  Furthermore, disaggregation by industrial classifications shows that although 
labor regulations continue to exert negative effects, location choices are also conditioned on 
other factors such as proximity to raw materials and minerals.   
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  1Introduction 
 
In the interests of increasing the pace of development, countries have begun to re-
examine the way they do business.  Governments in developing countries talk about reforming 
laws and removing roadblocks to usher in a golden age of vigorous domestic and foreign 
investment.  Reforms in various spheres including the financial sector, taxation, agriculture, 
industrial policy, pollution regulation, infrastructure, intellectual property rights (IPR), and labor 
laws are needed to enhance global competitiveness.  But disaggregation of this issue is important 
in order to get a clear view of the link between regulations and investments at the micro level.  
This paper serves to do just that.  It takes a detailed look at the effect of labor regulations on new 
investment decisions in the various states of India, and finds that pro-worker legislation has a 
strong negative effect on location choice. 
With the initiation of liberalization policies and economic reforms in India in 1991
1, the 
role of private investment in economic growth has gained significant importance.  States now 
compete with one another by instituting policies to attract new investment.  The consensus is that 
environmental and labor regulations are the key policy instruments that help or hinder a state’s 
industrial growth.  While there is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the effect of 
environmental and labor regulations on a firm’s location and investment decision, especially on a 
global and US level, insufficient attention has been paid to such relations in developing countries 
One of the few papers that investigates labor laws in a developing country context is Besley and 
Burgess (2002). They find that movement towards pro-worker policies is linked to declines in 
employment and output for Indian manufacturing industries.  However, there has been little 
                                                 
1 India started major economic reforms and nationwide liberalization in 1991 in response to a fiscal and balance of 
payments crisis.  These reforms encompassed all major areas – like industrial policy, trade and exchange rate policy, 
tax reforms and public sector policies.  
  2research on how these labor reforms affect a firm’s incentives at the micro level – that is, how 
they affect the location of new plants.  By analyzing the effect of labor regulations on new 
investment, we address this gap in the literature.  
Labor regulations encompass a wide variety of laws ranging from those formulated to 
ensure the health and safety of workers to those aimed at resolving industrial disputes.  The 
former category includes policies on minimum wages, work hours, and health and safety 
standards for factories – all aimed at preventing the worker from being exploited by the 
employer.  The second broad category of labor laws is aimed at ensuring the rights of both 
workers and employers.  These deal mainly with the rights of workers to unionize, collective 
bargaining processes, layoff policies, mechanisms to resolve disputes, and policies on strikes and 
lockouts. The focus of this analysis is how these factors affect the input costs of firms and hence 
their location decisions in the various states of India.  We employ both institutional and informal 
labor regulation variables to analyze how a firm chooses its location, and we study new 
investments that occurred between 1995-2002 in India. 
The paper consists of three main sections.  The first gives a brief literature review and 
also discusses the differing pace of reforms in various Indian states, India’s labor laws, and the 
diversity in labor regulations across Indian states. The second section gives an overview of the 
data.  The third section discusses the methodology and empirical findings.  We study several 
different questions including the effect of labor regulations on firm location decisions, the 
sensitivity of these results to choice of labor and non-labor variables, whether effects differ with 
the inclusion of controls for formal labor legislation, and whether differential effects exist by 
industry.   
  3We find that state-wise number of labor courts, number of unions on register, and number 
of man-days lost in disputes resulting in work stoppages all have strong negative effects on 
location choice probabilities.  All variables in the estimations are scaled by gross state product, 
which controls for differences across states in industry size and manufacturing presence.  Our 
results are very robust to the inclusion of other labor regulation (for example, the number of 
industrial tribunals registered in the state) as well as other non-labor-regulation variables (for 
example, a Human Development Index value for the state).  Our results are also unaffected by 
taking institutional labor legislation (based on Besley & Burgess, 2002) into account.  Lastly, we 
estimate a more flexible specification that allows us to consider that certain industries are 
constrained by their need for proximity to sources of raw materials and minerals.  We find that in 
our data, such considerations are particularly important for mining and agricultural projects.   
 
Section 1 - Literature Review 
Regulation, Investment, and Firm Location Choice 
  A long-standing debate among economists and practitioners concerns the effect of 
various regulations on the economic growth of a country.  Conventional wisdom holds that, for 
example, in the case of environmental regulations, stringent controls and higher compliance 
standards raise abatement and compliance costs, making the region less attractive to investors.  
In a similar vein, pro-worker policies like the right to unionize, may retard investment.  We 
consider these issues in greater detail below. 
We start by focusing on the body of literature on determinants of firm location decisions.  
While none considers labor regulations per se, these papers provide useful insights into factors 
that may retard or encourage new investment. Most employ conditional logit models to study a 
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factors, economic parameters, and indicators of existing industrial environment – all of which 
can affect the operating costs of firms.  In particular, environmental regulations, wages, energy 
costs, property value, and unemployment generally have negative impacts on location 
probabilities, whereas population and better infrastructure have positive impacts (Wolverton, 
2002; List and Co, 2000; Levinson, 1996; McConnell, V. D. and Schwab, R, 1990).   
Additionally, recent work (Keller and Levinson, 2002) has found that pollution abatement costs 
have deterring effects on foreign direct investment across states in the U.S.   
In terms of labor regulations specifically, results are mixed.  For example, the presence of 
unions increases the collective bargaining power of workers and raises wages – this factor should 
thus negatively affect location decisions.  But evidence for the US ranges from a positive and 
significant relationship between the percentage of unionized workers and location choice 
probabilities (List and Co, 2000), to no relationship (McConnell, V. D. and Schwab, R, 1990), to 
significant negative impacts of unionization (Bartik, 1985).  However, differences in right-to-
work laws across U.S. states are found to have strong effects, with more “pro-business” states 
attracting the lion’s share of manufacturing activity (Holmes, 1998). 
In the case of developing countries, Kuncoro (2000) has found similar effects of wages 
and infrastructure on the location decisions of firms in Indonesia.  For India, Mani, et al. (1997) 
fail to find evidence that environmental policies affect a polluting firm’s location decision.  They 
explain the insignificance of their results by arguing that other factors may be important 
determinants of plant location choice.  One such factor is labor legislation.  
 
 
  5State-Level Regulatory Environment in India 
Regulations are an important component of the business environment of a country.  For 
India as a whole, economic reforms have moved at a healthy pace since 1991.  At the state level, 
however, the pace of reforms has been slow.  Bajpai and Sachs (1999) point to three factors that 
may have contributed to this.  First, the lack of effective decentralization has hampered states’ 
decision-making power.  Second, insufficient institutional infrastructure at the state level has 
made implementation of reforms difficult.  Third, political instability has led state governments 
to focus on short-term goals.  
  The authors classify states into three categories – the ‘reform-oriented states’, 
‘intermediate reformers’, and ‘lagging reformers’.  The first category comprises Andhra Pradesh, 
Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu.  The reform-oriented states have done much 
better in attracting both domestic and foreign investment and have consequently grown faster 
than their neighbors.  Andhra Pradesh, for example, has instituted far-reaching industrial reforms 
that cut through red tape and make the siting of plants easier.  It has also reformed worker re-
training, reorganized public sector units, implemented tax reforms, and initiated self-certification 
in certain industries (Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2003).  Since 1995, Gujarat has instituted 
comprehensive policies in areas of privatization, incentives to accelerate investment in backward 
areas, simplification of rules and procedures, reform of the power sector, infrastructure 
development, and encouragement of private entrepreneurship (Government of Gujarat, 2003).  
Karnataka, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu have all pursued vigorous industrial reforms aimed at 
attracting new investments. 
The intermediate reformers include Haryana, Orissa, and West Bengal.  These states have 
not undertaken far-reaching reforms like the leaders, but they have started some growth-oriented 
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Orissa and Haryana.  Both states have revised tariff rates to decrease the agricultural power 
subsidy, and they have taken steps towards seeking private investment in the power sector.  The 
laggards consist of Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.  These 
states have taken small steps towards a comprehensive growth policy; however, even among 
these states, some have made major changes in areas of industrial policy (Bajpai and Sachs, 
1999)
2.   
 
India’s Labor Laws  
Labor laws in India are all-encompassing and have far-reaching impacts upon the 
industrial climate of the country.  Most practitioners agree that in order to attract domestic and 
foreign investment, these laws need to treat employers and employees in a more balanced 
manner.  Consequently, the various states of India have attempted to institute both formal and 
informal changes in their bylaws.  In this section, we give an overview of the changes that have 
occurred at both the center and state levels. 
  The Factories Act of 1948 and the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 are the two most 
important acts that govern working conditions in factories and provide a mechanism for the 
settlement of industrial disputes.  The former seeks to set standards for safe working conditions; 
mandates working hours and vacation and overtime policy; and sets health and safety standards.  
                                                 
2 Bajpai and Sachs, 1999. This paper contains a very detailed list of state-level reforms in India. The reform 
categories are broken down into broad categories like investment incentives, power reforms, industrial policy 
reforms, infrastructure, and tax reforms. Investment incentives include infrastructure and fiscal incentives. Power 
sector reforms are in the area of tariff revision, restructuring, regulatory commissions, un-bundling, seeking private 
investment, and licensing issues. Industrial policy reforms encompass private investment promotion, fiscal 
incentives, infrastructure, and transparency in rules and government decision-making. Infrastructure reforms include 
policies on roads, ports, and telecommunications. Tax reforms consist of transition to VAT, abolition of OCTROI 
(entry tax on consumption goods collected at state borders), and policies on agricultural income tax, and 
simplification of rules.  
  7This Act, along with the Equal Remuneration Act of 1976, the Minimum Wages Act, the 
Payment of Bonus Act, and the Maternity Benefits Act; constitute the backbone of the labor laws 
in India today. 
 The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 and the Trade Unions Act seek to protect the worker 
from being exploited by the employer.  The former provides guidelines for settling disputes, and 
also lays out conditions under which a worker may be laid off and the various ways of redressing 
the situation.  The latter grants workers the right to unionize and outlines certain protections and 
privileges that union members would enjoy.  Although these acts apply to all states in India, their 
efficacy depends on the political will of each state government.  
  Heterogeneity in labor regulations at the state level arises from two sources.  First, 
depending on the nature of the government in power, states themselves pass amendments to 
labor laws that are more pro-worker or more pro-employer than the central government law.  Our 
discussion of such formal amendments to state level labor regulations closely follows Besley and 
Burgess, 2002, who consider all state level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 
from 1958-1990 and code each one as neutral, pro-worker, or anti-worker
3.  Second, the 
implementation of laws may be affected by other considerations.  For example, in a state like 
West Bengal, the Communist party has been in power for the past twenty years.  It is common 
knowledge that the party has a pro-worker bias.  This may affect outcomes of collective 
bargaining, disputes, and strikes, even without any formal changes in labor policies at the state 
government level.   
                                                 
3 A complete summary of all the amendments and the coding is available at http://econ.lse.ac.uk/rburgess. A pro-
worker amendment is coded as a one, a neutral amendment as a zero, and an anti-worker amendment is coded as a 
negative one. 
 
  8Although recent work has shown that stringent pro-worker regulations have negative 
impacts on the economic performance of states in India (Aghion, et al; 2002; Besley and 
Burgess, 2002; Bajpai and Sachs, 2000), no study has analyzed how such regulations at the state 
level affect the location decisions of new plants in India.  By undertaking such an analysis and 
demonstrating that location choice is very sensitive to the nature of labor legislation within the 
state, this paper contributes to the literature in the area. 
    
Section 2 - Data Background 
  The data used in this study are from two primary sources - Center for the Monitoring of 
the Indian Economy (CMIE) and Indiastat.  We use data from CMIE, which tracks every new 
investment made in India from July 1995 to July 2002.  The data limitation that we face is that 
the date of initiation is known for only some of the projects.  This prevents us from exploiting 
any time-series variation.  The CMIE data set has information on the location of new projects as 
well as other plant characteristics such as status, ownership, type, and industrial classification.  
Table A gives a more detailed breakdown of these characteristics.  For purposes of this study, we 
exclude projects in the service and irrigation sectors.  Our sample thus consists of 5065 projects. 
  9Table A 
Project Characteristics 
Project Characteristics  Description 
Project Status Proposed, Under Implementation, Completed 
Project Type New Unit, Substantial Expansion, Renovation/Modernization, 
Renovation/Modernization - Substantial Expansion, Rehabilitation 
Project Ownership Private Indian, Private Foreign, State Govt., Central Govt., Joint 
Sector, Cooperative Sector. 
 
Our independent state-level variables are obtained from the Indiastat
4 database. This is an 
online data service that contains time-series data on all labor regulation variables, as well as 
information on all economic, social, demographic, and political variables, both at an all-India 
level and at the state level.    
  
Location Choice 
  During the period we consider, the geo-political map of India has undergone dramatic 
changes.  Three new states have been carved out of old ones – Jharkhand was originally a part of 
Bihar, Chattisgarh was a part of Madhya Pradesh, and Uttaranchal originated from Uttar Pradesh.  
For our purpose, we classify these new entities under their original states.  We also code union 
territories under the closest (by distance) state.  For example, Dadra and Nagar Haveli is 
indistinguishable in terms of socio-economic characteristics from Gujarat; thus projects here are 
coded as having located in Gujarat. Similarly Chandigarh is classified under Punjab; Goa, 
                                                 
4 This data can be found at www.indiastat.com
 
  10Daman, and Diu are coded under Maharashtra; and Pondicherry is coded under Tamil Nadu.  A 
detailed list of the coding is reported in Appendix Table 1. 
In our estimation, each project has the choice to locate among 16 different states.  These 
include the 14 states in India that have a substantial industrial presence, the union territory of 
Delhi, and a catchall category that includes other states, as seen from Appendix Table 1.  Our 
choice of these locations is motivated by the Besley & Burgess, 2002, analysis. We assume that 
for a new plant, the site location address is the most relevant.  The registered office address is 
usually the location of the central office, which is often predetermined in India.  When large 
conglomerates and private business houses like the Tatas and Ambujas started in the early post-
independence era, they generally located the central offices in the home states of the 
entrepreneurs.  But for profit-maximizing firms, the location decisions of new projects should be 
influenced by political, regulatory, and economic considerations in the local siting area.  Thus, 
our location variable is the site address of the project.   
Appendix Graph 1 shows the distribution of projects among the various states, where the 
number has been normalized by gross state product.  As is evident from Graph 1, Karnataka is at 
the forefront of receiving new investments, followed by Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, 
and Maharashtra.  These are the reform-oriented states as identified in the Bajpai and Sachs, 
1999 study. 
 
Labor Regulation Variables 
Labor regulation variables can be broadly classified into two main categories – variables 
that capture labor regulation on-the-ground, and the state-level institutional (formal) amendments 
to the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947.  For the first category, we consider several alternatives, 
  11including the number of labor courts in the state, number of strikes and lockouts, number of 
unions registered in the state, and number of man-days lost due to strikes and lockouts.   
Appendix Table 2(a) provides the summary statistics for these variables.  Appendix Graph 2 
shows the main labor regulation variables used in the estimations (these too have been 
normalized by gross state product).  These figures show an inverse relationship between new 
investment (Graph 1) and the pro-worker stance of the state (as captured by the number of unions 
on register and number of man-days lost in disputes resulting in work stoppages in Graph 2). 
The second category of labor regulation variables includes formal amendments to labor 
laws at the state level.  These amendment classifications are based on coding developed by 
Besley and Burgess, 2002, where each amendment is categorized as pro-worker, pro-employer, 
or neutral.  Instead of using the author’s categorization, we use counts of the total number of 
amendments (from 1949 – 1990) per state, and the total number of pro-worker amendments per 
state over the same time period.  Adopting this method allows us to control for the amount of 
labor-related legislative activity in a state, particularly activity that is anti-employer.  We believe 
that for example, a state that passes 6 pro-worker amendments is not viewed in the same light as 
a state that passes only 1 such amendment.  
 
Other Variables of Interest 
  In addition to labor regulations there are other factors that could potentially influence 
location choice.  These are summarized in Appendix Table 2(a). The most important among 
these are input costs, since wages and power tariffs determine a large part of the daily operating 
costs of most plants.  We use the average daily wage rate of unskilled urban male and female 
workers in our estimations.  In India, power rates vary by the size of the industry and also by 
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estimation purposes.  Our results remain unchanged when we alternatively control for tariff rates 
of medium and heavy industries.   
  Other economic explanatory variables include growth of net state product per capita from 
1994 to 1995, growth of employment from 1983 to 1994, an urban Gini coefficient for 1995, and 
a Human Development Index (HDI) for 1995.  We believe that, for India, the growth of net state 
product serves more as an indicator of the overall health of the state rather than as a gauge of 
market size.  For most products, firms consider their market to be the all-India market.   
The employment growth variable estimates the number of jobs that are being created in 
the state in a particular year, and is also an indicator that other firms are locating in that state.  
This may serve two purposes: (1) it tells a potential investor that the business climate of the state 
is attractive enough for other firms to locate there, and (2) given the presence of other firms, 
gains may be had from potential agglomeration and positive spillover effects.    
  The Gini coefficient measures income inequality in the state, and the effect of this 
variable is unclear.  In the US there is a substantial literature on environmental justice 
(Zimmerman, 1993; Boer et al. 1997) that suggests that environmentally polluting plants may be 
drawn to lower income minority areas (areas with high inequality).  Firms may believe that such 
areas would be less politically active, and there would thus be less collective action (Hamilton, 
1995; Arora and Cason, 1998).  On the other hand, investors may choose to move to states with 
low inequality, since this signals a better overall industrial climate (median voter literature).  The 
HDI variable is an aggregate measure of various social and economic development 
characteristics.  We hypothesize that new firms would want to locate in states at higher stages of 
social and economic development. 
  13We also control for environmental regulation in a state.  Absent other good measures, we 
use state-wise environmental outlay normalized by gross state product.  Depending on how firms 
perceive such expenditures, that is, as substitutes or complements to their own environmental 
outlay, the sign on this variable could go either way.  If firms view such expenditures as 
complements, then high environmental expenditures by the state would indicate tighter 
environmental regulations, and thus higher compliance costs for the firm.  In this case, it would 
be less likely to locate in such a state.  On the other hand, if the firm views the two expenditures 
as substitutes, then a higher state outlay would signal a larger budget for environmental cleanup.  
Firms may be more likely to locate in such states since they believe that their share of 
environmental clean-up costs will be small. 
Other factors in our study include literacy rates for 1991 and workforce participation 
rates for urban males (1993-94).  Literacy rates are important because they proxy for labor 
efficiency and productivity.  New firms would want to locate in states with higher literacy levels 
as this may reduce their worker training costs.  The workforce participation variable is an 
indicator of the size of the effective labor force.  Thus this variable should affect location choice 
probabilities positively.  We also include (normalized) measures of research and development 
(R&D) expenditures by the state government in our estimations.  We hypothesize that state 
support for research and development will have a positive effect on location choice decisions.  
Lastly, dummies for mining and agricultural projects are used to analyze whether labor 
regulations have differential effects by industrial classifications; the classifications for all 
projects in our data are as reported in Appendix Table 2 (b).     
The next section discusses the econometric methodology and reports the results obtained 
from our various specifications. 
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Section 3 - Empirical Model and Results 
  To obtain a preliminary sense of the relation between aggregate number of new projects 
and variations in state-level labor regulations, we estimate a simple count model using a negative 
binomial specification.  Our unit of observation is the state, and the dependent variable is the 
total number of new projects in that state.  The labor regulation variables are number of labor 
courts in the state in 1995, number of unions registered in the state in 1995, and the number of 
man-days lost due to disputes resulting in work-stoppages in 1995.  Given degrees of freedom 
constraints, we estimate a parsimonious form of the model (our controls include power tariffs, a 
state level Gini coefficient, and wages for unskilled males).  Explanatory variables are 
normalized by gross state product in 1995 to control for differences in economic activity levels 
across states.  Results indicate that stringent labor regulation has significant negative effects on 
the total number of new projects in a state.  Since our basic hypothesis is validated in this 
aggregate model, we investigate micro-level firm location decisions next. 
  We hypothesize that the state-level location decision of projects is a function of labor 
regulation variables as well as other socio-economic indicators from 1995 or earlier.  As noted in 
previous studies (Wolverton, 2002), an analysis in which the location decision is concurrent with 
the values of independent variables may suffer from simultaneity bias.    We use variables from 
before the time the project-siting decision is made to control for this, although we acknowledge 
that in the presence of time-persistent unobservables that influence both labor variables and 
industrial development, such controls may be insufficient.  But controlling for simultaneity bias 
should only make our results stronger.  This is because the likely reverse causation has the 
opposite (positive) sign.  That is, if we believe that development spurs additional labor laws in 
  15order to protect citizen’s welfare, then our current coefficients under-estimate the true effect of 
labor regulations.  Controlling for endogeneity caused by the presence of time persistent 
unobservables should make our coefficients more negative in magnitude (the unobservables 
cause a conservative bias in our estimates). 
 
Estimation Methodology 
  Following the literature on location choice theory, a conditional logit model is used.  A 
firm is given the choice of locating its project among sixteen alternative states.  Fifteen of these 
indexes correspond to fifteen states in India, and the last index is an agglomerate “other states” 
category (See Appendix Table 1 for list of States/Union Territories and corresponding index 
classifications).      
Project location choice is influenced by state-level labor regulation variables, costs of 
inputs, socio-economic variables such as a state level urban/rural Gini coefficients, and other 
variables such as state government sponsored research and development expenditures.  These 
variables are believed to affect the net profits of projects and will thus influence location 
decisions.  Our use of the conditional logit model presumes that a project is sited in the state 
where net profits are the highest.  Suppose that for the ith project faced with J location choices, 
net profits from the jth location are given by 
ij ij ij x ε β π + =
'           (1) 
where   includes various labor regulation variables, socio-economic variables and 
infrastructure variables, and 
ij x
ij ε  is a random project-and location-specific disturbance. If project i 
is located in state j, it is assumed that  ij π  is maximal among the J alternative net profits.  Hence, 
the probability that location j is chosen is: 
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This leads to the conditional logit model with the following log-likelihood: 
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where   if  , and 0 otherwise.  The total number of projects (n) is 5065, and, as noted 
above, the total number of location choices (J) is sixteen.  We only use generic variables that 
vary by location and not by project in our model.  Thus, we implement the simplest form of the 
conditional logit that estimates common location-specific coefficients. 
1 = ij d j Yi =
The conditional logit is modeled on the assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), which does not allow for correlation across the unobservables of the sixteen 
net profit equations.  This assumption is clearly a strong one to make, since profits may be 
correlated across states and regions.  Following earlier literature (Bartik,1985), we attempt to 
relax the IIA assumption and allow for correlation in the disturbance terms for states within a 
region by introducing five regional dummy variables.  Four of these capture states that lie in the 
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fall in our “other” category. When estimating the models, Region 4 is the omitted category. 
Table B below shows the states that are included under each dummy. 
Table B 
Regional Dummies 
Dummies Regions  States 
Region 1  North  Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi 
Region 2  South  Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka 
Region 3  East  Bihar, Orissa,West Bengal 
Region 4  West  Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra 
Region 5  Other  Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Mizoram, Nagaland, 





The first column of Appendix Table 3 shows the results from the basic model.  As 
hypothesized, labor regulation variables, such as the number of labor courts in the state, number 
of unions registered in the state, and the number of man-days lost in disputes resulting in work 
stoppages in the state, have strong negative effects on the likelihood of project location.  All of 
these variables are significant at or below the 5% level.  As discussed earlier, projects are less 
likely to locate in states where they perceive a predominantly pro-worker environment.  
Variables that capture the cost of inputs such as the power rate for large industries and the 
average daily wage of unskilled male laborers also have strong negative effects on location 
choice probabilities.  Large input costs imply smaller net profits, and thus smaller location choice 
  18probabilities.  Indicators of state infrastructure, like state support to research and development 
expenditures, positively affect the likelihood of project location, as does the growth of per capita 
net state product and the workforce participation rate of urban males.   
The urban Gini coefficient, which captures income inequalities at the state level, has 
strong positive effects on the dependent variable.  The positive sign suggests that projects are 
more likely to locate in states with large income inequalities.  As discussed before, this supports 
the environmental justice literature.  Given that a large portion of our sample consists of 
manufacturing and mining plants with potentially significant negative effects on the 
environment, the positive sign on the Gini variable is not unexpected.   
As the basic model in Appendix Table 3 shows, the regional dummies are highly 
significant.  The excluded region is region 4, which includes states such as Maharashtra, Gujarat, 
and Madhya Pradesh.  These states have a substantial manufacturing presence.  Therefore, as 
expected, the included regional dummies are all negative, suggesting lower location choice 
probabilities in these regions as compared to region 4. 
Columns 2 through 5 of Appendix Table 3 test the sensitivity of the basic model to the 
inclusion of different labor regulation and socio-economic variables.  From column (2), it is 
evident that the state-level number of disputes has a negative effect on project location 
probabilities, just as the other labor regulation variables had.  But from (3) we find that the 
number of industrial tribunals in a state positively affects choice probabilities. This may be 
because industrial tribunals and labor courts serve very different functions. Firms may view the 
existence of industrial tribunals as an indication of a positive business climate in the state, where 
they could potentially benefit from the due process of law.   
  19Large magnitudes for costs of inputs such as the power rate and the average daily wage 
for unskilled labor continue to remain disincentives for location choice in all alternative 
specifications. The negative effect of wages remains strong even if unskilled female labor is 
considered, and the effect of power rates remain unchanged with controls for rates specific to 
heavy industries as opposed to rates for large industries.  The workforce participation rate for 
urban males is not significant in most specifications, and the Gini measure remains strongly 
positive (except in (5)).  In (4), when we substitute a state-level human development index (HDI) 
value for the Gini measure, the variable is estimated imprecisely.  In all the specifications 
considered (columns 2-5), state-wise support to research and development continues to have 
strong positive effects, and the regional dummies continue to have significant negative effects on 
location choice probabilities. 
Several other variables are included in the sensitivity analysis.  When percentage growth 
in employment is substituted for growth of net state product in (4), it yields a positive and 
significant coefficient.  This is as expected, since states that are viewed to be growing with 
vibrant economic bases are more likely to attract new units.  As expected, a state’s literacy rate 
has a positive effect on a firm’s location decision in (5).  From specification (5), we also find that 
the coefficient for environmental outlay is positive and significant, implying that firms are more 
likely to locate in states with higher environmental outlays.  
All alternative specifications show that the results of the basic model are not sensitive to 
the inclusion of other labor, demographic, and socio-economic variables.  A pro-worker state is 
less likely to attract new business.  However, Appendix Table 3 only reports the coefficients and 
we are unable to judge the magnitude of effects from this.  In order to interpret the coefficients, 
  20we calculate own-and cross-elasticities in the next section.  These elasticities enable us to judge 
to what extent and by how much each of these variables affects location choice probabilities. 
 
Elasticities for the Basic Model
 The interpretation of own-and cross-elasticities in this case are analogous to the familiar 
price-elasticity framework.  Own-elasticity measures the “responsiveness of an individual’s 
choice probability to a change in the value of some attribute” (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
Similarly, cross-elasticities show the responsiveness of an individual’s probability of choosing 
location i when the value of some attribute changes in location j.  To calculate the own-and 
cross-elasticities, we proceed in the following manner.  We first calculate individual elasticities 
and then calculate their weighted average using choice probabilities as weights.  Suppose there 
are “i” locations to choose from, “n” projects that are choosing between these locations, and “k” 
regressors or attributes. Then disaggregate own elasticity is given by: 
k ink n
i n P
ink x x i P E β )] ( 1 [
) ( − =  
where Pn(i) is the probability of a particular project “n” choosing location “i”, xink is the attribute 
of interest
5, and βk is the coefficient on attribute k from the conditional logit model. 


























                                                 
5 In our particular case, there are no individual-specific attributes. All variables are generic. Thus we write xik instead 
of  xink. 
  21Aggregate cross-elasticities may be calculated in an analogous manner.  In the interest of brevity, 
we perform these calculations for the basic model only.  The results are reported in Appendix 
Table 4.  The calculations suggest that for a 1% increase in the normalized number of labor 
courts within the state, the probability that a project will be located in that state decreases by 
approximately 0.3%.  Similarly, for a 1% increase in the normalized number of unions registered 
and the normalized number of man-days lost in disputes resulting in work stoppages, location 
choice probabilities at the project level fall by approximately 0.2% and 0.5%, respectively.  The 
signs and magnitudes of the cross-elasticities (also reported in Appendix 4) are also as expected.  
For example, for a 1% increase in the normalized number of labor courts in other states, the 
probability that a project will be located in this state increases by approximately 0.4%.  These 
results confirm that states perceived to have a pro-worker tilt attract fewer projects.   
 
Sensitivity to Formal Labor Regulation 
  The labor regulation variables discussed as of now capture the on-the-ground impact of 
labor legislations.  But formal labor laws and amendments may also be important.  We introduce 
these to test for the robustness of our included labor regulation variables, and to account for an 
alternative source of disincentives in choice of locations.  As noted above, our formulation of the 
formal labor regulation variable is a modification of the variable used in Besley & Burgess, 
2002.  
First we use a count of all the labor law amendments passed by a state.  A priori, we are 
agnostic about the sign of this variable, since it is an aggregation of all amendments – pro-
worker, pro-employer, and neutral.  If firms interpret a large number of amendments in the labor 
arena as a sign of the state being pro-worker, then this variable will have a negative effect.  We 
  22also control for the total number of pro-worker labor amendments passed by each state.  We 
hypothesize a negative coefficient on this variable.  Appendix Table 5 shows the results for our 
basic model with the inclusion of the formal labor law variables discussed above.   
  Column 1 of this table shows that the coefficient on total labor-related amendments is 
negative and significant at the 5% level.  Hence, firms perceive states with a large number of 
labor amendments as less employer-friendly, and they are thus less likely to locate in these 
states.  In columns 2, we consider the number of pro-worker amendments passed by each state.  
We formulate such a disaggregation in order to consider only pure pro-worker legislation effects 
at the state level, and to exclude the confounding effects of states that pass anti-worker and 
neutral legislation.  The result for the total number of pro-worker amendments shows that it has a 
strong negative effect on location choice probabilities.  Other variables in both specifications 
have the same effects as before, with on-the-ground labor regulation variables (number of labor 
courts, number of unions registered, and man-days lost due to work stoppages) continuing to 
influence location choice probabilities negatively.  Thus, both in terms of the political ambience 
and the actual regulations in effect, states viewed as pro-worker will be less desirable locations to 
invest in. 
 
Analysis by Industrial Classification
  One important consideration so far neglected in our analysis is the effect of resource 
constraints on project siting decisions. For example, projects related to mining would not have a 
large degree of freedom in deciding choice of location, since such projects need to be situated 
close to sources of raw materials.  Hence, no matter how strong labor regulations are in a state, if 
that state happens to be a source of important raw materials and minerals, we would expect to see 
  23positive location choice probabilities for mining projects in that state (relative to the base case).  
We believe that such constraints primarily affect agricultural projects and projects related to 
mining, since they are unlikely to be as footloose as manufacturing projects. To account for this, 
location-specific constants are interacted with two industry dummies specific to mining and 
agriculture.  Appendix Table 6 shows the results for our basic model with the introduction of 
these dummies.  
  From the results in this table, it is evident that resource constraints are important factors 
in determining location choice.  Bihar and Orissa are the states of India that have substantial 
deposits of minerals and ores.  As column 1(b) shows, despite the negative effects of labor 
regulation variables, the interactions of the dummy for mining with alternative specific constants 
2 (Bihar) and 9 (Orissa) have strong positive effects, implying that compared to the base case 
(Location 1, Andhra Pradesh), mining projects have a higher probability of locating in Bihar and 
Orissa.  Such significant positive effects are not evident in these states for agricultural projects 
(columns 2(b).  Uttar Pradesh (choice 13) and West Bengal (choice 14) lie in the Ganjetic plain, 
and are thus among the most fertile regions in India.  Column 3(b) of the table shows that the 
interactions for these states with an agricultural dummy have significant positive effects on 
location choice probabilities.  In both specifications of Appendix Table 6, labor regulation 
variables continue to exert strong negative effects.   
 
Conclusion 
The results in this paper strongly support our hypothesis that labor regulation variables 
have significant negative effects on location choice probabilities.  As illustrated by the 
conditional logit estimation of our basic model, the number of labor courts within the state, the 
  24number of unions registered at the state level, and the state-wise number of man-days lost due to 
labor disputes all act as disincentives on project location choice.  The results are very robust to 
the inclusion of other labor regulation variables, such as the number of industrial tribunals and 
the state-wise number of workers involved in disputes.   
  Costs of input variables; such as wages of unskilled labor and the power rate for large 
industries, also have the hypothesized effects.  Socio-economic indicators, such as a state-level 
Gini measure and a human development index value, have strong positive effects.  Additionally, 
industrial infrastructure variables, such as a measure of state support for research and 
development and the workforce participation rate of urban males, positively influence location 
choice probabilities. 
  We undertake a disaggregation of regulation effects by industrial classifications.  Our 
basic results are robust to these alternative categorizations, and the labor regulation variables 
continue to exert strong negative effects on project location choice.  Furthermore, we allow for a 
differential effect of formal labor legislation (as opposed to labor regulations on-the-ground) in 
our estimations.  Our results remain robust in all cases. 
   The results of this analysis have important policy implications.  The strong negative 
effects of labor regulation variables suggest that states perceived as more pro-worker may suffer 
from a lack of industrial investment.  This may have negative repercussions, not just on state 
output and productivity growth, but could potentially have negative spillover effects in terms of 
employment generation (such states will attract fewer new projects, and thus generate fewer new 
jobs).  This will further reduce welfare levels, and may lead to increased poverty and deprivation.   
  We recognize that these results are conditional in nature – the question that we consider 
is the particular location of a project, given that a project is going to exist.  There may be 
  25unconditional effects as well since restrictive laws could deter new projects.  We hope to address 
this question in future work, our use of the conditional logit model and lack of knowledge on the 
initiation dates of projects prohibits us from analyzing this question here.  Moreover, given 
paucity of data, we could not address industry agglomeration effects, or possible linkages 
between labor legislations in the long run and regional per capita income, or the link between 
legislations and the presence of industries that are constrained by their need to locate near 
sources of raw materials.  These are additional questions on our future agenda. 
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Appendix Table 2(a) 
Summary Statistics 
Key Labor Regulation Variables  Input Cost Variables 
Power Tariffs for 








Man-days lost in 
disputes resulting 
in work stoppage 




Laborer in ‘95 
Andhra Pradesh  440  6  4409  4136  351.9  374.2  24.7 
Bihar  98 14 1930  628  140.5  212.0  24.9 
Gujarat 479  21  1831 819  233.6  281.9  26.2 
Haryana 145  0  1036  49  351.0  351.0  54.5 
Karnataka 596  12  3810  420  278.4  397.5  22.6 
Kerala 104  4  10236  1722  171.6  183.0  64.8 
Madhya Pradesh  214  26  903  97  334.4  390.1  22.8 
Maharashtra 1040  14  3007  617  299.2 307.5 24.4 
Orissa 126  3  1531  133  285.0  334.6  24.4 
Punjab 113  6  1272 151  240.5  274.5  59.6 
Rajasthan 169  1 3054  446  309.0  330.0  38.4 
Tamil Nadu  526  7  3219  758  244.4  259.1  34.3 
Uttar Pradesh  260  19  1994  517  398.6  428.8  32.0 
West Bengal  326  2  8965  3799  354.1  333.3  27.1 
Other 179  1  114 122  172.5  166.0  40.2 
Delhi 256  10  1557  47  345.2  384.3  46.1 
 
Economic Variables  Demographic 
Variables 











































(billions of Rs, 
93-94 prices) 
Andhra Pradesh  3.90  0.38  23  0.3210  54.4  44.1  182.0  420  611.14 
Bihar 6.80  0.31  32  0.3090  43.9  38.5  55.0  120  421.15 
Gujarat 19.40  0.40  21  0.3035  57.7  51.0  38.0  360  597.34 
Haryana 5.00 0.44  16  0.2800  51.9  55.8  13.0  1569  231.99 
Karnataka 3.30  0.41  19  0.3150  54.2  56.0  193.0  200 462.09 
Kerala 8.10  0.59  3  0.3400  55.9  89.8  71.0  440  288.41 
Madhya Pradesh  -0.30  0.33  30  0.3260  47.1  44.2  59.0  1684  542.91 
Maharashtra 0.20  0.52  9 0.2767  50.8  70.5  86.5  245  1503.67 
Orissa 2.40  0.35  28  0.3040  51.0  49.1  24.0  184  198.22 
Punjab 0.25  0.57  7  0.3375  59.5  68.2  37.0  100  470.50 
Rajasthan 17.00 0.35  27  0.2900  49.0  38.5  50.0  496 391.23 
Tamil Nadu  4.45  0.52  10  0.3215  54.9  68.7  98.5  434  743.14 
Uttar Pradesh  2.90  0.31  31  0.3240  48.2  41.6  231.0  500  926.47 
West Bengal  5.00  0.40  20  0.3350  55.0  57.7  196.0  340  570.41 
Other 1.18  0.45  16  0.2692  49.4  62.3  6.9  122  292.80 
Delhi 7.30  0.62  2  0.3760  53.8  75.3  170.0  53  2192.42 
   32
 
 






Industry Sub-Categories  
Manufacturing  
 
Base Metals, Chemicals, Electric Machinery, Electronics, 
Fats and Oils, Leather, Misc. Manufacturing, Non-electrical 
Machinery, Plastics, Pulp and Paper, Textiles, Transport 
Machinery, Wood 
  
Mining and Quarrying 
 
Minerals, Non-metal Minerals 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
 
Agriculture, Animals, Foods 
Electricity, Gas and Water 
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Appendix Table 3 
Basic Model and Sensitivity of Results to Other Variables 
Variable Basic  Model 
(1) 
Sensitivity to Other Variables 
   (2)                    (3)                     (4)               (5) 
State-wise Number of Labor Courts   -45.96 ** 
(2.465) 
-37.84 **   
(2.334) 
-51.99 **   
(2.713) 
-36.42 **  
(2.301) 
-23.84 **   
(2.541) 
Number of Unions Registered in ‘95  -0.047 ** 
(0.012) 
-0.042 **  
(0.012) 
-0.080 **  
(0.013) 
-0.033 **  
(0.008) 
-0.049 **   
(0.009) 




 -0.076  ** 
(0.011) 
-0.054 **   
(0.012) 
 
Number of Disputes in 1994    -1.403 **   
(0.173) 
    
Number of Industrial Tribunals      111.21 **  
(17.87) 
   
State-wise support to R&D Projects  5.192 ** 
(0.627) 
2.631 **  
(0.710) 
1.568 **  
(0.854) 
4.998 **   
(0.421) 
4.602 **   
(0.503) 
% Growth Rate of Per Capita Net State 
Dom. Product in ‘95 
0.011 * 
(0.007) 




  0.043 **   
(0.005) 
% Growth in Employment        0.250 **  
(0.048) 
 
State Environmental Outlay          0.119 **   
(0.036) 
Power Tariffs for Large Industry   -0.003 ** 
(0.001) 
-0.002 **   
(0.001) 
-0.002 *  
(0.001) 
  -0.002 *  
(0.001) 
Power Tariffs for Heavy Industry        -0.004 **   
(0.001) 
 
Literacy Rate in 1991          0.030 **  
(0.003) 
State-wise urban Gini-coeff. in 1995  5.620 ** 
(0.994) 
2.378 **   
(0.964) 
1.844 *   
(1.146) 
  -0.837   
(1.221) 
State-wise Human Dev. Index (1991)        0.437   
(0.309) 
 
Average Daily Wage for Unskilled Male 
Laborer in ‘95 
-0.016 * 
(0.010) 
-0.028 **   
(0.010) 
-0.020 **   
(0.009) 
   
Average Daily Wage for Unskilled Female 
Laborer in ‘95 
      -0.030 **   
(0.007) 
-0.058 **   
(0.012) 




0.028 **   
(0.012) 
-0.005   
(0.012) 
-0.005   
(0.009) 
-0.002   
(0.009) 
Region 1 Dummy  -1.869 ** 
(0.257) 
-1.294 **  
(0.263) 
-0.861 **  
(0.294) 
-1.523 **   
(0.136) 
-0.620 **   
(0.233) 
Region 2 Dummy  -1.302 ** 
(0.107) 




-1.211 **   
(0.067) 
-0.913 **   
(0.101) 
Region 3 Dummy  -1.964 ** 
(0.093) 
-1.620 **   
(0.104) 
-1.312 **   
(0.140) 
-1.811 **   
(0.093) 
-1.174 **  
(0.126) 
Region 5 Dummy  -2.136 ** 
(0.182) 
-1.858 **   
(0.189) 
-1.695 **   
(0.196) 




Pseudo  R2  0.088  0.088 0.090 0.088  0.089 
Sample size is 5,065 projects.  Table reports coefficients and not odds ratios.  Standard Errors in Parenthesis. 
** Significant at the 5% level.  * Significant at the 10% level.   34
 
Appendix Table 4 
 
Basic Model and Elasticities 
 




       Own                                 Cross 
         (2)                                     (3) 
State-wise Number of Labor Courts   -45.96 ** 
(2.465) 
 
     -0.003                  0.004 
Number of Unions Registered in ‘95  -0.047 ** 
(0.012) 
 
      -0.002                  0.002 
Man-days lost in disputes resulting in 




      -0.005                  0.001 
State-wise support to R&D Projects  5.192 ** 
(0.627) 
 
        0.011                  -0.004 
Power Tariff for Large Industry   0.011 * 
(0.007) 
 
       -0.009                   0.005 
State-wise urban Gini-coeff. in 1995  5.620 **       
(0.994) 
 
        0.013                   -0.010 
Average Daily Wage for Unskilled 




        0.003                    0.003 
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Appendix Table 5
 









Counts of All Labor Related Amendments  -8.215  **             
(1.673) 
 
Counts of  Pro-Worker Amendments    -16.921  **                
(4.079) 
State-wise Number of Labor Courts   -47.77  **                 
(2.496) 
-50.713  **                
(2.725) 
Number of Unions Registered in ‘95   -0.033  **            
(0.012) 
-0.039  **                  
(0.011) 
Man-days lost in disputes resulting in work stoppage ‘95  -0.089  **                
(0.011) 
-0.081  **                  
(0.011) 
State-wise support to R&D Projects  5.017  **                  
(0.613) 
5.473  **                   
(0.616) 
% Growth Rate of Per Capita Net State Dom. Product in ‘95  0.019  **                 
(0.007) 
0.016  **                   
(0.007) 
Power Tariffs for Large Industry   -0.003  **                  
(0.001) 
-0.003  **                  
(0.001) 
Urban Gini-coefficient in 1995  4.751  **                   
(0.996) 
5.788  **                   
(0.983) 
Average Daily Wage for Unskilled Male Laborer in ‘95  -0.024  **              
(0.010) 
-0.023  **                  
(0.010) 
Workforce Part. Rate for Urban Males ’93-‘94  0.009                         
(0.011) 
0.011                         
(0.011) 
Region 1 Dummy  -1.663  **               
(0.255) 
-1.806  **                  
(0.254) 
Region 2 Dummy  -1.257  **           
(0.106) 
-1.408  **                  
(0.109) 
Region 3 Dummy  -1.855  **             
(0.093) 
-1.850  **                  
(0.095) 
Region 5 Dummy  -1.983  **             
(0.179) 
-2.097  **                  
(0.177) 
Pseudo R2  0.089  0.089 
Log Likelihood  -12791.77  -12795.33 
Table reports coefficients and not odds ratios.  Standard Errors in Parenthesis. 
** Significant at the 5% level.  * Significant at the 10% level.   36
Appendix Table 6






















Number of Labor 
Courts  





















-0.928 **   
(0.283) 
Man-days lost in 
disp. result. in 
work stop. ‘95 
-0.098 *  
(0.011) 









support to R&D 
Projects 
6.283 **  
(0.714) 








% Growth Rate 












Power Tariff for 
Large Industry  
-0.004 **  
(0.001) 

















-0.316 **  
(0.159) 
0.317 *  
(0.184) 
Ave. Daily Wage 
for Unskill. Male 
Lab. in ‘95 
-0.011  
(0.010) 




0.845 **  
(0.228) 
-0.971 **  
(0.483) 
Workforce Part. 




0.008  (0.012)    Choice10* 
Ind. Dum. 






-1.938 **  
(0.280) 










-1.473 **  
(0.122) 










-2.162 **  
(0.107) 




-0.702 **  
(0.279) 




-2.275 **  
(0.204) 




-0.354 *  
(0.214) 




-12738.10 -12752.27    Choice15* 
Ind. Dum. 






0.093 0.092    Choice16* 
Ind. Dum 




Sample size is 5,065 projects.  Table reports coefficients and not odds ratios.  Standard Errors in Parenthesis. 
** Significant at the 5% level.  * Significant at the 10% level. 
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